Attention is capacity-limited (Becker & Pashler, 2005; James, 1890; Pashler, 1998) and necessary for the explicit recognition of objects in our environment (O'Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink, 2000; Simons & Rensink, 2005) . If something appears in one's environment, but is not attended, it often goes unnoticed (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons & Chabris, 1999) . Inattentional blindness (IB), the failure to detect an unanticipated object when one's attentional capacity is consumed by an ongoing task, highlights the important role that attention plays in conscious recognition (Mack, 2003; Mack & Rock, 1998; Simons & Chabris, 1999) . For example, experienced pilots using flight simulators failed to notice when a jumbo jet appeared on the runway on which they were landing. This failure resulted even though the plane was clearly visible through the windshield, and presumably occurred because the pilots' attentional capacity was consumed by the other tasks required to successfully land a plane (Haines, 1991) . This example and many others demonstrate that early attentional filtering can have a profound effect on the information that one extracts from and, thus, how one experiences the world. As a result, there has been a great deal of recent research investigating the processes that guide the allocation of attention.
One clear finding from this work is that a person can exert significant top-down control over the attentional filter, forming a filter that allows objects that have perceptual features consistent with one's current goal to pass through the filter, while blocking from further processing objects that have features inconsistent with the goal (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005) . For example, Most et al. (2005) found that people who were asked to attend to a number of moving black objects while ignoring moving white objects often detected when an unexpected black object appeared in the display, but failed to notice when the unexpected object was white. This finding demonstrates that people's immediate goals create an "attentional-set" that tunes their attentional filters so that objects that are consistent with their goals are more likely to be passed through the attentional filter (Folk et al., 1992; Most et al., 2005) .
Here we ask a slightly different question. We investigate whether one's current emotional state or mood creates an "emotional set" that influences the attentional filter. That is, does one's mood help tune the attentional filter, thereby influencing the types of objects that are likely to capture attention and become part of one's conscious experience? To investigate this question, a mood induction task was followed by an IB task in which the unexpected object was an emotional face. By systematically varying the congruency between participants' mood and the valence of the face, we hoped to determine how mood influences attentional capture.
We hypothesized that the people would be more likely to notice the unanticipated additional object when its valence was congruent with the observer's mood. This conjecture was based on ample evidence suggesting biases for negative stimuli in participants that were selected for anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 2005) or depression (Eizenman et al., 2003) . The finding of a bias toward negative stimuli in these disorders that are associated with increased negative affect (Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988 ) is broadly consistent with a mood-congruent attentional bias (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005; Koster, De Raedt, Leyman, & De Lissnyder, 2010; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) . By contrast, most experiments that have investigated attentional biases for emotional stimuli in nonselect populations or populations that are or selected to be low in anxiety or depression, have either failed to find an emotional bias (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) or have found a bias away from negative stimuli (Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse, & Neufeld, 2008) . Given that most people report having more positive than negative affect (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) , the finding of a bias away from negative and toward positive in these experiments is consistent with a mood congruent bias. Although this line of reasoning led us to predict a detection benefit when the unexpected object was congruent with a person's mood, we were not at all certain of this outcome.
Our uncertainty was driven by two factors. First, there are substantial and substantive differences between the tasks previously used to support a mood congruent attentional bias and the inattentional blindness task we used. Most previous research (see Yiend, 2010 , for review) used either modified cuing paradigms (see Frewen et al., 2008 for review; MacLeod et al., 1986) , or visual search (Matsumoto, 2010; Rinck, Becker, Kellermann, & Roth, 2003; Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005) paradigms to demonstrate that attention is biased toward an emotionally charged stimulus. In both of these methods the location and/or identity of the critical target object is unknown and the participant must find the target among multiple possible objects or locations. As such, one could describe these tasks as divided attention tasks (see Pashler, 1998 Chapter 3, for a review) that evaluate the relative weighting of an emotional object in the competition for attention when the attentional system is attempting to shift attention to a new object. By contrast, in the inattentional blindness procedure one is not attempting to find a new object to which to attend, but instead already has a prespecified attentional task and is attempting to maintain attentional focus on that task. As such, this task is represents a selective attention task (see Pashler, 1998 Chapter 2, for a review) in which the detection of the unexpected object represents the interruption of an ongoing attentional task, and thus indicates how well a stimulus captures attention away from an ongoing task (Most et al., 2005) or causes an interrupt signal that interrupts ongoing attentional control (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) .
In addition to the above theoretical concerns, there are also a number of published reports that suggest that we might not find a mood congruent advantage. For instance, there are claims that people should exhibit a mood-incongruent attentional bias to maintain homeostasis (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994; Gawronski, Deutsch, & Strack, 2005; Rothermund, Wentura, & Bak, 2001) . Others have suggested that positive mood results in a wider attentional focus (Rowe, Hirsh, Anderson, & Smith, 2007) , which would predict that people placed in a positive mood should be more likely to detect an unexpected stimulus regardless of its valence. Finally, there are suggestions that a negative mood leads to more drifts in attention (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009) , which would predict that people placed in a negative mood should be more likely to detect an unexpected stimulus regardless of its valence.
In short, while there is consensus for mood-congruent attentional biases among people who are depressed or anxious, there is less of a consensus that the same bias exists in nonselect populations. In addition, none of the previous research has used an inattentional blindness task to evaluate whether a mood congruent stimulus can capture attention away from on an ongoing focused attentional task.
Method Participants
Two hundred thirty-eight university undergraduates with normal or corrected to normal vision participated for course credit.
Procedure
All participants were run individually in dimmed, sound attenuated booths that had a PC and 19 in. CRT running at 100 Hz. All surveys, the mood manipulation and experimental displays were programmed in Macromedia Director and the data was automatically saved into texts files for off-line analysis. Participants completed the State Trait Anxiety Inventory questionnaire before participating in the experiment. During the first phase of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to receive a positive, negative, or neutral mood induction procedure. In the neutral condition, participants wrote about the route that they took to arrive at the lab. In the positive and negative conditions (see Appendix) participants were asked to write descriptive words about an emotional life event (Richter & Gendolla, 2009; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996) . Participants could journal for up to 4 min, or could self-terminate the induction task at any point after the first minute. On average participants wrote for over 2.5 min (M ϭ 152 s, SE ϭ 4.08 s) and the amount of time journaling did not vary by mood induction condition [F(2, 233) Ͻ 1].
Immediately after the mood induction task, participants performed a variation of Most et al.'s (Most et al., 2001 ) IB paradigm. Participants were shown six stationary white disks that appeared on a black display window surrounded by a gray boarder. Each ball had a diameter of 2.4 degrees of visual angle and the display window was a 15 ϫ 11°rectangle in the center of the computer display. Three balls were empty while the other three contained the scrambled features of a schematic face (see Figure 1 ). After 2 s, each disk began to move in an independent, pseudorandom path. Periodically, the disks occluded one another, changed directions, and changed speeds (between two speeds: ϳ2 and ϳ3 deg/s). When a disk reached the edge of the black display window, it bounced off the edge. Participants were asked to track the three empty balls and count how many times they bounced off the side of the display. The entire tracking phase lasted for 16 s, after which subjects reported the number of bounces that the empty disk made.
Consistent with previous experiments (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2001) , trials one and two had no unexpected event. In trials three through five, an unanticipated seventh ball appeared 7 s into the tracking task. This disk contained the same features as the distractor disks, but the features were unscrambled so that the disk appeared to contain a schematic, emotional face. For a given participant, the face was either smiling or frowning for all three trials in which it appeared. The unexpected disk drifted into the display window from the upper right corner and drifted across the screen for 6 s, exiting on the lower left. If the unexpected disk crossed paths with any other disk, it occluded the other disk.
Trial three, the first trial in which the face appeared, was the critical IB trial. After participants reported the number of bounces they detected in trial three, they completed a brief mood manipulation check that consisted of four questions that they rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (see Appendix). Two of these questions assessed the participants' mood and two assessed arousal level. One of the two questions assessing a given variable was reverse coded. Following the manipulation check, participants were asked if they had seen anything odd during the tracking task. If they selected "no," they advanced to trial four. If they selected "yes," a text box appeared and they typed a description of the odd event before proceeding to Trial 4. These descriptions were used to verify that participants had detected the unexpected ball.
Because participants were asked about the presence of an odd item in trial three, the fourth trial was considered a divided attention task in which participants might be monitoring the display for odd items (Most et al., 2001 ). In the fifth trial, participants were instructed to no longer count the ball bounces and simply watch the display. This trial was used to verify that the face stimuli were highly visible if attention was not otherwise engaged. Only two participants failed to detect the face in this trial and their data were eliminated from the analyses.
Results

Manipulation Check
The manipulation check confirmed that the mood induction procedure was effective; it influenced mood, F(2, 233) ϭ 8. 
STAI Survey
To verify that our assignment to conditions did not produce groups that differed in anxiety we ran two 3 ϫ 2 ANOVAs, one with state and one with trait anxiety as the dependent variable. Each ANOVA had three levels of mood induction and two levels of stimulus valence. Both main effects and the interaction were nonsignificant for both measure of anxiety (all F Ͻ 1).
The IB Trial
In Trial 3, we found fairly high rates of IB; across all conditions the unanticipated disk was detected by only 23.3% of the participants (see Table 1 ). These high IB rates are surprising given prior reports that face stimuli are relatively immune from IB (Devue, Laloyaux, Feyers, Theeuwes, & Brédart, 2009; Mack & Rock, 1998) . More importantly, the data suggest that people were more likely to notice a face that was congruent with their mood than one that was incongruent (see Figure 2 ). To evaluate this congruency effect, we used binary logistical regression to model the detection responses. A model with only the mood induction term and the facial emotion term was no better than the base model without them, 2 (1) ϭ .89, p Ͼ .3. However, including an interaction term in the regression model that coded whether the faces and mood induction were incongruent (sad/smiling and happy/frowning), were neutral (neutral mood/smiling and neutral mood/frowning), or were congruent (sad/frowning and happy/smiling) significantly improved the model fit, 2 (1) ϭ 5.314, p ϭ .021, and the interaction term was significant, p ϭ .024. Subsequent chi-square tests indicate the interaction resulted because participants were significantly more likely to detect a frowning face when they received the sad mood induction than the neutral, 2 (1) ϭ 4.02, p ϭ .045, or happy, 2 (1) ϭ 4.77, p ϭ .029, mood induction. While there was a trend for people to detect more smiling faces in the happy mood condition than the neutral or sad mood condition, the effect did not approach significance, both p Ͼ .4. Note. Numbers of detected faces are presented, with the number of missed faces in parentheses. Each row corresponds to the type of unexpected face (happy or sad). Columns are grouped by mood induction condition, with Trial 3 on the left and Trial 4 on the right.
Distractors Unexpected Target
Frowning Stimuli Smiling Stimuli Figure 1 . IB method. The top panel is a schematic of the stimuli used in the IB task. Participants tracked the three empty disks for 16 s as they moved in a pseudorandom fashion occasionally bouncing off the side of the display window. Participants' task was to count how many times the empty disks bounced off the sides. In Trials 3-5, an unanticipated seventh ball appeared 7 s into the tracking task. It could display a happy or sad face and drifted into the screen on the upper right and traversed across the screen, exiting on the lower left. It was visible for a total of 6 s. After Trials 3-5, participants were asked whether they noticed anything odd during the tracking task. The bottom panel shows the odd item and the to-be-ignored disks for each facial emotion condition.
The Divided Attention Trial
Detection rates increased dramatically in the fourth, divided attention trial; across all conditions the face was detected by 78% of the participants (see Table 1 ). Even so, the congruency effect was still present when assessed by the regression method (interaction term, p ϭ .012) used to analyze the data from Trial 3. Follow up chi square tests reveal that the source of this interaction was that the smiling face was detected by more people in the happy mood condition than the sad mood condition, 2 (1) ϭ 5.66, p ϭ .017, while there was a nonsignificant trend for more people to detect the frowning face when they were in the sad mood condition than the happy mood condition, 2 (1) ϭ 1.61, p ϭ .21. Thus, even though people may have been dividing attention to monitor the display for an unexpected event, the face was easier to detect when its emotional valence matched their induced mood.
Ball Counting Errors
Total counting errors were generally low (across all trials, the average counts were within 6.3% of the actual number of ball bounces) and did not vary as a function of mood induction condition or face stimuli; an ANOVA with three levels of mood induction and two levels of face stimuli found no main effects nor an interaction, all Fs Ͻ 1. We also examined whether people who detected the face in the critical IB trial had different error rates than those who experienced IB. Participants who detected the face in Trial 3, made no more errors in trials one and two, t(234) ϭ .80, p ϭ .43, but those who detected the face made significantly, t(234) ϭ 2.95, p ϭ .003, more errors (M ϭ 9.6%, SE ϭ 1.8%) in Trial 3 than those who experience IB (M ϭ 5.2%, SE ϭ .6%). This pattern of data suggests that those who noticed the face were as engaged in the primary task (Trials 1 and 2); however, when the face broke though their attentional filter it diverted attention away from the primary task leading to more ball counting errors in the IB trial.
Detection Performance and Individual Differences
In post hoc analyses, we investigated whether the few individuals within a mood induction condition who detected the unexpected stimulus were different in terms of their anxiety level or responsiveness to the mood induction than those individuals who experienced IB. To perform these analyses within each mood induction condition we ran separate 2 (smiling/frowning face) ϫ 2 (detected/experienced IB) ANOVAs with state anxiety, trait anxiety, and self-reported mood as the dependent variable. These analyses allowed us to determine whether those in a mood induction condition who noticed the unexpected object differed from those in the same condition who experience IB.
We found little evidence that those who detected the unexpected object differed from those that experienced IB in terms of anxiety. For state anxiety, both the ANOVA for the happy and sad mood induction conditions yielded nonsignificant main effects for stimulus valence and detection group and no valence by group interaction (all p Ͼ .15). The pattern was the same when trait anxiety was used as the dependent variable, with no comparisons approaching significance (all p Ͼ .12) except for a trend toward a valence by detection group interaction that appeared only in the sad mood manipulation condition, F(1, 73) ϭ 3.39, p ϭ .07. This trend resulted because people who detected the smiling face tended to have lower anxiety scores (M ϭ 35.90, SE ϭ 3.35) than those that missed it (M ϭ 39.93, SE ϭ 1.94), but those that detected the frowning face tended to have higher anxiety scores (M ϭ 43, SE ϭ 2.83) than those that missed it (M ϭ 37.3, SE ϭ 2.21). This pattern is broadly inconsistent with the suggestion that our mood-congruent bias was driven by a subset of participants with aberrant anxiety.
A similar pair of ANOVAs was run using the self-reported mood ratings (given during the manipulation check) as the dependent variable. For the group that experienced the sad mood induction procedure, neither of the main effects nor the interaction approached significance, all F(1, 80) Ͻ 1. By contrast, for the happy mood induction participants there was a main effect of face valence, F(1, 72) ϭ 8.41, p ϭ .005, and a marginal main effect of detection group, F(1. 72) ϭ 3.69, p ϭ .06, both qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 72) ϭ 6.87, p ϭ .01. The source of this interaction (see Figure 3) , was that the mood ratings for participants that detected a sad face (M ϭ 4.4, SE ϭ .45) were much lower than participants that detected the happy face (M ϭ 6.04, SE ϭ .29), missed the sad face (M ϭ 5.75, SE ϭ .18), and missed the happy face (M ϭ 5.83, SE ϭ .19). This pattern of results is inconsistent with the possibility that our findings of a moodcongruent bias were driven by a subset of participants that were particularly influenced by the mood induction procedures. Instead, the results demonstrate that the few people who noticed the frowning face despite being in the happy mood induction condition were those who self-reported low affect, a finding that is broadly consistent with the overall mood-congruent finding.
Discussion
The data from the IB trials suggest that stimuli which are congruent with one's current mood are more likely to "break through" the attentional filter during an attentionally demanding task. As such, the findings demonstrate that one's mood influences the attentional filter, creating an "emotional set" that biases attention such that mood congruent stimuli are more likely to capture attention, much as an "attentional set" biases attention toward stimuli that have goalcongruent features (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Most et al., 2005) . This finding is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Our findings demonstrate a mood-congruent attentional bias in response to a temporary mood shift among a nonselect group of participants. Most previous research documenting mood-congruent attentional biases have demonstrated the effect in anxious (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) or depressed samples (Frewen et al., 2008) that have relatively long lasting negative affect. In addition, the few studies that have reported mood congruent attentional biases because of short term mood manipulations have focused on the finding that positive mood manipulations increase attention to positive material (Tamir & Robinson, 2007; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006) . By contrast, our mood-congruent result from the IB trial was primarily driven by the participants in the negative mood condition; the frowning face was invisible to almost everyone except for those in the sad mood manipulation condition. It is worth noting that we found only a slight trend for a mood-congruent bias for those in the happy condition in the IB trial; however, there was a significant happy congruent bias in the divided attention trial. As a result, we think our data is broadly consistent with, or at least not inconsistent with, previous reports of mood congruent attentional biases for induced positive moods (Tamir & Robinson, 2007; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006) . Thus, our finding provides additional evidence of a mood congruent attentional bias among nonselect samples, and extends this claim to people placed in a temporary negative mood.
In addition, the current research is the first to use an inattentional blindness task to investigate mood-congruent biases. This task differs in important ways from the modified attentional cuing paradigms and visual search paradigms that have been used to investigate moodcongruent attentional biases (Yiend, 2010) . In those paradigms, the participant is asked to select the appropriate location from among a set of alternatives. As such, the tasks intentionally engage attentional selection mechanisms and then examine how different stimuli are weighted within the competition inherent to the selection process. In short, they examine the mechanics of this selection competition in a task where one must choose a new location for attention. By contrast, in the inattentional blindness task, the participants are not asked to select new object for attention. Instead, they are asked to maintain their attention on a prespecified set of objects. In this paradigm, the detection of the unexpected object reflects an engagement of the attentional selection process despite volitional control to suppress it; it represents an interruption of this volitional control (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) . In addition, this interruption appeared to divert resources away from the primary task, thereby producing more ball counting errors in those participants who noticed the unexpected object. To our knowledge we are the first to demonstrate that the mood-congruent bias can disrupt ongoing attentional control in this way.
Although we consider the use of the inattentional blindness task as a strength of our design, the low detection rates raise the possibility that our results are driven by a few participants that might be somewhat aberrant. To investigate this possibility, within a given mood induction condition, we compared the anxiety ratings and self-reported mood of those who detected the face with those that experienced IB. In general, we found no evidence that our participants who experience mood-congruent biases were aberrant in either their mood or anxiety. Indeed, the only interesting effect from these analyses was that the people in the happy mood induction condition who detected the mood-incongruent frowning face, were those who self-reported low affect. This effect could be interpreted as additional evidence for a mood-congruent attentional bias; only those for whom the happy mood induction procedure failed detected the frowning face. However, one should be cautious in making this interpretation. Given our desire to ensure that the effects of our mood manipulation lasted throughout the critical IB trial, we placed the mood manipulation check after the presentation of the unexpected face. Thus we cannot rule out an alternative interpretation of this effect. It is possible that those who detected the frowning face subsequently reported their mood as lower, either because of demand characteristics or because the detection of a frowning face decreased their mood.
Summary
We found that one's mood can alter attentional filtering such that mood congruent stimuli are more likely to break through an attentional filter and become part of one's conscious experience. This finding suggests that mood can influence very early and basic cognitive processes and cause an interruption in the ongoing volitional control of attention. This early gating of information may, at least in part, contribute to mood's ability to influence more complex cognitive processes such as judgment and decision making (Cryder, Lerner, Gross, & Dahl, 2008; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003) .
In short, we have long known that whether one reports the glass as half full or half empty may depend on the person's mood. The current research suggests that this might not simply be a response bias, but that the person's mood may actually alter which aspects of the environment reach awareness, such that people in a positive mood selectively perceive the full part of the glass while people in a negative mood selectively perceive the empty portion. Figure 3 . Self-reported mood as a function of condition and detection performance. The left side of the figure plots data for the group that received the happy mood manipulation and the right plots the group that received the sad mood manipulation. Within each mood manipulation group, means are further broken down by detection performance (whether participants detected the unexpected object or experienced IB) and the valence of the unexpected stimulus.
